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Abstract
Parading elements of the Southern African Development Community’s 
(SADC) Brigade took pride of place at the opening of the 2007 SADC Summit 
in Lusaka, Zambia. This SADC Brigade is tied in closely to both the security 
architecture of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union (AU) and 
the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. In the recent past (1998), military interventions 
by SADC members into Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DR Congo) caused the SADC to become known for its military (ad)ventures 
rather than for amicable progress towards a security community committed to 
development. In part, internal war in the DR Congo and other war-legacies such 
as those in Angola still taint the strategic landscape of the SADC. In addition, 
very sophisticated ships and aircraft are being delivered to South Africa while 
political militancy plays a prominent role in the 2008 Zimbabwean crisis. Are 
these events indicative of a militarised SADC strategic culture as opposed to the 
declared pacifist preferences to resolve conflicts?





In a debate that reflects more disagreement than consensus, Neumann and 
Heikka (2005:5-23) argue that state behaviour and strategic culture stand in 
close proximity. In this regard Snyder (1977) used strategic culture initially to 
explain different approaches, attitudes and preferences by the United States 
(US) and the former Soviet Union for possessing and if needed, for employing 
nuclear weapons. The close nexus between state behaviour and strategic culture 
also features prominently in the earlier literature on strategic culture by Gray 
(1999), Johnston (1995), Howlett and Glenn (2005), and Klein (1991). Although 
first-wave literature strongly focused upon the state-strategic culture nexus, the 
saliency of regional security and regional arrangements increased as the Cold 
War faded. In effect, the state-centric focus obscured the growing interplay 
between strategic culture and regional arrangements to prevent conflict in the 
international system or to contribute to the resolution of such conflict. At the 
turn of the 20th century the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and 
the Asia-Pacific region drew increased scholarly attention (Cornish & Edwards 
2001; Haacke & Williams 2007a; Haacke & Williams 2007b; Booth & Trood 
1999).1 Decision-makers also seem to judge the regional level of security all the 
more significant (Haacke & Williams 2007b:2) as the use of coercive power in its 
most threatening form – military power – (Adler & Barnett 1998:428) remains a 
lingering option that tends to unfold regionally first.
Regional security arrangements typically deal with external threats, but internal 
instabilities may be a motivating factor as well (Adler & Barnett 1998:425). As an 
emergent regional security community, members of the SADC have little to fear 
from external military threats.2 In effect, SADC appears to follow a normative 
preference for moving from enmity towards amity to prevent a possible 
intraregional war. Preferably the SADC migration from enmity to amity should 
1 The work by Haacke and Williams culminated in the paper they presented to the Standing 
Group on International Relations of the European Consortium for Political Research 
Conference in Turin, 13-15 September 2007 (Haacke & Williams 2007c).
2 SADC comprises the following countries: Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.
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progress at the declaratory as well as operational levels with the ultimate aim of 
promoting human security.
In this article, the author pursues the matter of an SADC strategic culture and 
seeks to demarcate indicators of militarisation. The first section of the article 
briefly attends to regional security and security communities, security culture 
as well as strategic culture and militarism. The second section explores strategic 
culture at the regional level and some contours of an evolving SADC strategic 
culture are demarcated. The third section comprises an attempt to isolate certain 
indicators of militarisation in certain SADC countries. Both regional, as well as 
country-specific indicators of possible militarisation are explored. In conclusion, 
a brief summary and concluding remarks on militarisation within the SADC are 
offered.
Regional security, security culture and strategic culture
Security theorists, such as Buzan (1991), Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998) but 
also Lake and Morgan (1997), underline the growing importance of the regional 
level of security. Regional entities harness the potential and the contributions 
of members through cooperative, collective or common security arrangements. 
The EU, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Southeast Asia 
and the AU are some examples of regional organisations that now harvest the 
inherent potential of regionalism towards more security for member countries. 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Central Asia, with Russia 
and China as its most prominent members, also draws increasing attention 
from analysts (De Haas 2007). Furthermore and in spite of some apprehension, 
the United Nations (UN) continues to view regional organisations as gateways 
for promoting security and settling conflicts in their respective communities 
(United Nations 1992).
Security features at the heart of regional communities and, in the words of Adler 
and Barnett (1998:4), ‘who is inside and who is outside, matters most’. Snyder 
(1999:102-103) alludes to the different cooperative and collective arrangements 
for states, and inadvertently the role of military force remains part of the picture 
in the light of its contributions to prevent or terminate armed conflict. Adler 
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and Barnett (1998:30), however, point out the difficulty for a community of 
states to assume shared norms, values and symbols and a subsequent common 
pacifist disposition to shape their security – a feature not uncommon to the 
SADC, as explained below (Nathan 2006:605-622). Ultimately, however, the 
eradication of the use of military coercion becomes the desired norm for security 
communities.
In order to protect their interests, countries turn to those in their immediate 
vicinity and agree on arrangements to lower threats and vulnerabilities. Over 
time, member states begin to share core values that stem from common 
institutions, mutual identity and loyalty (Adler & Barnett 1998:69-70). The 
wellbeing of a security community turns upon protecting the national good and 
eventually also the collective good of the community – a duality that members 
do not always heed (Adler & Barnett 1998:13, 36). Member states moreover often 
ignore pacifist pathways to protect national or communal interests. While the 
EU requires a robust strategic culture to intervene externally when so desired, 
analysts also raise questions about the conventional military profile of the SCO 
(Cornish & Edwards 2005:801; De Haas 2007:10-11).
Strategic culture results from the central tenets and operational assumptions 
of a security culture. In effect, security culture acts as the guiding intelligence 
for strategic culture and serves to ‘… establish durable security preferences by 
formulating concepts of the roles, legitimacy and efficacy of particular approaches 
to protecting values’ (Haacke & Williams 2007a:17). At regional level, certain 
basic assumptions need to be shared between members: the importance of 
security referents, dimensions of security, views of the general politico-security 
environment and the purpose of the regional arrangement. Security culture thus 
sets the scene for the operation of strategic culture.
Strategic culture also informs parties about government preferences for 
using their armed forces to pursue state policy. If this preference becomes too 
pervasive, militarisation could well set in. Some theorists define militarisation 
quite widely as a range of social and political phenomena on the more practical 
and material use of the armed forces and their presence as being more pervasive 
than discreet. Employed against real and perceived enemies, internally and 
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externally, armed forces feature prominently in the defence and pursuit of 
interests, but do not always constitute a pervasive and explicit value system 
as found under Praetorianism. Under Praetorianism, the civilian and military 
authorities almost become collapsed with the military emerging as the de 
facto ruler (Frankel 1984:71, 131; Wiseman 1988:230-231). Different shades of 
militarisation are thus possible. One popular view is to equate militarisation 
with defence spending, but this only serves to indicate one pattern, and one 
difficult to calculate accurately, and to immerse in a much wider social activity 
(Frankel 1984:73-74). As opposed to stark boundaries delimiting the use of 
armed force, militarisation threatens the boundaries that contain and direct the 
use of armed coercion. Creeping elements of militarisation thus point political 
and military elites towards accepting the use of armed force to resolve certain 
matters, particularly if these elites share a common politico-strategic history 
(Wiseman 1988:233).
The growing role of regional agents of security inadvertently also amplifies the 
trans-national character of strategic culture (Neumann & Heikka 2005:18). Gray 
(2007:6), however, warns that communities do not all share and conform to 
common views on strategic matters. National political goals still direct or guide 
armed forces (Neumann & Heikka 2005:16) and contain ideas on and preferences 
for armed coercion. In this vein some governments employ their armed forces as 
a primary policy instrument; others prefer to keep armed coercion as a very last 
policy option while some prefer not to resort to armed coercion at all.
The definition and demarcation of strategic culture by theorists remain difficult 
and are recognised as such in most literature on the topic. One way for theorists 
to attend to conceptual difficulties is by contrasting security and strategic culture. 
Haacke and Williams (2007a:17-18) confine strategic culture to preferences on 
the use of force and describe it as being one component of a broader security 
culture that considers the use or non-use of military force to protect values. 
Booth and Trood (1999:11) define strategy as the military dimension of policy 
and strategic culture as the military dimension of political culture, and seek to 
keep concepts from merely collapsing into security and political culture. Several 
views on security and strategic culture thus coexist.
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The debate on strategic culture unfolds as three waves of theory. The first wave 
depicts strategic culture as ‘… historical experiences, national character, and 
geography, and they consistently lead to certain types of behaviour’. The second 
wave makes ‘… a clear distinction between strategic culture and behaviour, 
as well as between declaratory and secret doctrine’. Third-wave theorists view 
strategic culture as ‘… an entity that appears in the form of a limited, ranked set 
of grand strategic preferences over actions that are consistent across the objects 
of analysis and persistent across time’ (Neumann & Heikka 2005:7-8). Although 
there is this admittedly difficult debate devoid of consensus, the pathway 
followed in this article accepts the wider definitions of Haacke and Williams 
and that of Johnston, but heeds the qualification by Vale (1994:5-6) that ‘… the 
forces which underpin strategic culture, are far stronger than those which shape 
what we call “policies”’. Policies, according to Vale (1994:5) have a much briefer 
durability and life span, and they shift as governments change. Strategic culture, 
however, may only shift when fundamental politico-strategic shifts occur.
Preferences of different players mould and fix strategic culture over time (Gray 
2007:7). Regional players thus ‘inherit’ regional strategic culture that brings into 
focus different strategic preferences from individuals, groups, and member states. 
While individuals and groups facilitate strategic culture at the national level, it 
is more difficult at the regional level. Regionally shared experiences and beliefs 
often diverge, while claims of sovereignty regularly disrupt the desired common 
culture. Regional communities do not all behave in a similar fashion and often 
display preferences for engaging in a particular behaviour (Gray 2007:6, 9). 
The fact remains that once established and maintained, core tenets of strategic 
culture shift incrementally and very rarely in some fundamental fashion.
Strategic need drives a particular strategic culture and over time parties adopt a 
culture that satisfies that need (Gray 2007:11). This however, is not a conscious 
choice, but rather one that is buffeted and moulded by time and events. Assuming 
that a community has only one strategic culture is perhaps somewhat optimistic. 
Having more than one ‘way of war’ or having different ideas on dealing with 
strategic issues that require politico-strategic measures (Gray 2007:14-15; Vale 
1994:6) is not impossible. It is thus quite probable for two or more strategic 
cultures to compete within one regional community and to depict a greater or 
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lesser preference for military coercion. Certain constraints also mediate strategic 
culture as organisational factors, and preferences disrupt the preferred strategic 
culture and policy-strategy connectivity and make a compromise option more 
viable (Gray 2007:16; Gray 1999:144). 
Changes to strategic culture are possible, but they need to be qualified. As 
noted earlier, strategic culture changes slowly in response to those challenges 
that question its fundamental tenets and operational preferences. For example, 
should regime and state security feature prominently, while shifting to a culture 
that emphasises human security is bound to be very slow? Once a regional 
culture on the use or non-use of force is established, such a culture is bound to 
be more robust and durable than that of a state, as several communal linkages 
hold it in place (Haacke & Williams 2007a:22). Nonetheless, changes are effected 
over time, but result from deep seismic events and extensive communications. 
Norm entrepreneurs, such as new political incumbents, also play an important 
role to shift or maintain existing norms, ideas and preferences that sustain a 
particular culture (Kenkel 2003:12). These shifts, furthermore, flow across 
international boundaries to influence and change preferences of other actors in 
the system as well (Haacke & Williams 2007a:23). How much change and how 
rapidly, remains a polemic question, but analysts generally accept that change is 
possible, but slow in the making.
Preferably, the strategic culture of a collective entity should be cooperative and 
not necessarily common and all-embracing (Neumann & Heikka 2005:19). 
Sweeney (2007:7), for example, observes that expectations of similar strategic 
cultures amongst a collection of states (even for the EU) are unduly optimistic 
as several catalysts mould and form strategic culture at the national and regional 
levels. Regarding the EU, some hold the notion that a common (monolithic) 
strategic culture for the organisation is idealistic (Lianos 2006), with a more 
cooperative-styled strategic culture perhaps being more practical. Strategic 
culture is thus also the outcome of what member states bring to the regional 
agenda. In the case of ASEAN, several strategic cultures coexist, and in spite of 




A coherent or even common security culture does not emanate from merely 
forming a regional arrangement (Haacke & Williams 2007a:19), and this reality 
is most probably valid for strategic culture as well. Strong and weak states within 
a regional arrangement are also important mediators of the resultant culture. 
If weak states dominate the regional arrangement, a preference for state and 
regime security is bound to profit as weak bureaucracies and institutions increase 
perceptions of threats to sovereignty as well as external threats. As member states 
bring their peculiar security and strategic cultures along, they either interlock 
and predispose collective bodies towards particular policies, decisions and 
actions, or ‘disrupt’ the desired cultural consensus. Subsequently decisions and 
activities to deal with threats and vulnerabilities along common pacifist lines 
become compromised.
A security community intent upon a pacifist orientation to lower and eventually 
abandon the possibility of members settling differences by going to war requires 
a disposition of its members to heed the pacifist pathway. Regional entities 
do not automatically discard the use of force, and the possibility of military 
coercion to pursue or protect the national or communal good heightens the 
role of strategic culture. However, the use of force as a central tenet in a regional 
security culture often gives rise to controversy. This controversy constitutes a 
rivalry between two paradigms and there is bound to be a victory for one or the 
other, or the coexistence of proponents and opponents of using force (Haacke 
& Williams 2007c:14). In the SADC, as discussed below, undue competition can 
be traced as member states attempt to build a common pacifist approach amidst 
strong preferences to retain the military option.
Strategic culture and militarisation in the SADC
In a 1994 study on Southern Africa, Vale (1994:6-7) links future peace in the 
region to understanding the strategic cultures of the respective countries. These 
cultures hold real implications for regional relations because of their aversion 
to change and pledges for change rarely translating into quick and visible 
shifts (Vale 1994:18). One salient matter is thus whether Southern African 
governments have truly shifted their political cultures from that of liberation 
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movements and an inclination to co-employ politics and military coercion to 
a culture of fully-fledged political parties and governments. In a subsequent 
study on strategic culture and Southern Africa, Carim (1995:54) views strategic 
culture as a fresh and new pathway to research peace and security in the region. 
Regionally, however, strategic culture is important as it shapes shared norms and 
expectations towards regional arrangements (Carim 1995:61). 
Amongst the questions posed during 1994 and 1995, those about a militarist 
inclination in society and the sources that serve as its origins feature prominently. 
One lingering matter for the region identified by Vale, as well as Carim, is the 
use of military force to pursue objectives. Carim (1995:63) points out the role 
of apartheid legacies in the Southern African region and that of a culture to use 
armed coercion to enforce or defend. In retrospect, and following the demise 
of apartheid, several other legacies with a military connectivity lingered in the 
region. Continuous warfare in Angola and the DR Congo left military catalysts 
that still fester in the Southern African region. Surplus arms sustained a conflict-
prone culture in countries like Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Angola who all 
allocated noticeable proportions of their public expenditure to defence (Carim 
1995:64). Demobilisation in Southern Africa is a major, but slow undertaking 
(Porto et al 2007:ix), and continues to sustain a pool of trained, but unemployed 
military personnel. Add the South African armaments industry (Vale 1994:23-24; 
South Africa: Hardware developments 2005:16265) seeking out markets in the 
region and one finds a mix of factors that are bound to promote elements of 
militarism that are unlikely to fade quickly.
The official demise of apartheid by the mid-1990s did not effect an immediate 
termination of a strategic culture that privileged the military option to deal 
with regional differences. The strategic culture of apartheid extends beyond its 
official demise, and this ties in with the view that strategic culture shifts very 
slowly. In South Africa, the 1994 watershed coincided with a fundamental shift 
in political culture and new incumbents, but perhaps not necessarily a shift in 
strategic culture as well. Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and the 
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DR Congo are perhaps not spared a similar fate3 on account of being weak 
states on the one hand, and having earlier liberation cultures that are difficult 
to shed on the other. Vale (1994:25) argues that strategic culture (or perhaps 
elements thereof) can also be passed on, even if a previous culture is denied, 
found unwanted or vilified. Defence forces of South Africa and Zimbabwe, and 
currently in Angola, Mozambique and the DR Congo as well, became nation-
building institutions composed of forces that ‘passed on’ their own military 
cultures. Moller (2003:11-14), for example, confirms the earlier military 
(including colonial) origins of the authorities in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, with the DR Congo still struggling along a military 
pathway towards de facto political survival. 
In contrast to lingering military catalysts in the region, the SADC portrays a 
normative preference to become a security community through pacifist ways 
and means. In effect, one finds that SADC member states are attempting to 
follow a post-modern approach where common interests are set above national 
state interests (Sweeney 2007:5). For the SADC, a pacifist approach and non-
militarism thus feature as a preferred norm for members. Violating this norm by 
acting in a manner that tends to lean towards unilateral, coercive and military-
styled solutions is bound to elicit some response from those actors intent upon 
upholding the norm (Geldenhuys 2006:3). In the SADC, such a division is visible 
and discussed further in the following section.
The SADC mandate extends into the security and political domains, and 
fragile security hastened the creation of the SADC regional security forum. The 
preferred move from a coercive culture to a more democratic and pacifist one did 
not manifest as a once-off migration into a mature security community (Nathan 
2006:608). Article 5 of the SADC Treaty provides for the promotion of defence, 
peace and security and thus presents an entry point for elements of militarism. 
Article 4, however, stipulates the peaceful settlement of disputes that in turn 
reaffirms a pacifist approach to conflict.4 Nonetheless, not one SADC country 
3 Disarming the mind after a peace was concluded is an important step towards removing 
the idea that war and conflict is a normal way of life (Porto et al 2007: viii).
4 See Declaration and Treaty of SADC, Article 5, Objectives.
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comprehensively shut down its armed forces as part of its national strategy or 
declined to participate in regional military cooperation. Institutionally, each 
SADC member has a military establishment with regular forces destined for 
national and regional contingencies – a policy option still observable on the 
SADC strategic landscape.
The absence of common values towards a pacifist approach offsets the stated 
intention of an anti-militaristic SADC security policy (Nathan 2006:606-608). 
The earlier pacifist and militarist divide on the role and status of the SADC 
Organ only accentuated the fragility of the preferred pacifist approach. Nathan 
(2006:609) argues that some states did not take kindly to the declared anti-
militarist drive to inculcate a more pacifist SADC culture. The deliberations 
to resolve the impasse around control of the Organ became an increasingly 
closed process that excluded those (South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and 
Mauritius) who probably could have driven home the anti-militaristic drive. Up 
to 2001 the Organ remained in the hands of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, 
who became known for their preference for military coercion – a preference 
demonstrated by their military intervention in a fellow SADC country – the DR 
Congo. The militarist hold on the Organ by the Zimbabwe-Angolan-Namibian 
troika clearly shows the recent divide regarding the more militarist and pacifist 
members of SADC (Nathan 2006:610). In effect, the militarist group in the 
SADC held a preference for a collective defence arrangement while the pacifists 
led by South Africa preferred a common security regime.
Since 1994 an elaborate SADC security architecture took shape to deal with 
security through defence, policing and intelligence (Nathan 2006:611). The 
fact of the matter remains that the military option continued as an operational 
response, in spite of a declaratory preference that accentuated a pacifist policy 
route. Regional military arrangements remained part of the response hierarchy 
and also the sector where most progress (both declaratory as well as operationally) 
becomes visible. The Mutual Defence Pact (2003), the SADC Brigade (2007) 
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and the post-2000 prominence of South African armed forces in AU missions 
demonstrate most visibly the progress in the defence and security sectors.5 
Historically, Southern Africa is perhaps also a product of the dictum ‘War made 
the state and the state made war’ (Tilly 1975:42). After independence and more 
particularly since 1994, most SADC countries found that external threats calling 
for national defence seemed remote (Moller 2003:17).6 Independence, however, 
did not automatically translate into legitimacy, stability and strong institutions 
(Moller 2003:15) and the leeway to embrace the pacifist approach. Preferences 
for military solutions by certain SADC countries still disrupt the normative strive 
for a more pacifist regional strategic culture. In line with the weak state theory 
(Jackson 2001:69; Nathan 2006:618), the majority of SADC countries remain 
threatened by vulnerabilities stemming from unconsolidated democracies, 
institutional weakness and threats from within. The constitutional crisis in 
Swaziland, internal and external threats against the DR Congo, the legacy of war 
in Angola and institutional fragility in Zimbabwe only serve to highlight country-
specific weaknesses. Furthermore, economic weakness in Mozambique, threats 
of a coup in Lesotho and corruption in the Zambian presidency also point to 
weak state features in SADC countries (Nathan 2006:611). The aforementioned 
weaknesses as well as the limited range of policy instruments in weak states 
promote the inclination to resolve such vulnerabilities and subsequent threats 
through military coercion.
In spite of a visible lack of external military threats, AU and SADC security 
arrangements created new roles and functions for SADC militaries (Moller 
2003:20). Immersion in peacekeeping operations became a prominent activity 
for the armed forces of South Africa. In addition to the external missions, internal 
demands required of military forces to play a range of other roles: counter-
5 The preparation of a military structure for SADC is also driven by a responsibility to 
put in place a regional brigade for the African Standby Force of the African Union. (See 
Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council 
of the African Union).
6 More generally stated, African national security is primarily defended by military and 
security forces to oppose external threats and to ensure the controversial matter of regime 
security. See Solomon 2004:130.
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insurgency and constabulary duties mixed with privatised security and military 
companies while some SADC armies played an almost predatory role as in the 
DR Congo (Moller 2003:20). In addition, military-styled internal threats still 
linger, as post-war conflicts in the east of the DR Congo, the Cabinda question in 
Angola and the Caprivi region in Namibia represent threats to sovereignty that 
could well draw a military response (Ngubane 2004:52-54).
Defence demobilisation in Southern Africa did not unfold in a most efficient 
manner so as to lower the military profile of the region. Attempts to rationalise 
armed forces released large numbers of soldiers back into society, but not 
necessarily through a well-managed demobilisation process (Moller 2003:36; 
Porto et al 2007:ix). In effect, large numbers of military-minded individuals 
roam a region awash with arms and ample opportunities to return to military-
styled movements and institutions such as national military forces, newly 
established private security and private military companies, militias and militant 
youth movements. A gun culture evolved in much of the region and placed a 
reciprocal securitising burden upon governments to protect their communities 
and themselves through force if necessary (Porto et al 2007:16). How much 
money they spend on this priority, however, remains somewhat opaque.
As stated briefly earlier, defence expenditure is often viewed as an important 
indicator of militarisation (Frankel 1984:71). In the SADC, national defence 
expenditures present little evidence from which to infer militarisation. Except 
for Zimbabwe, none of the more prominent SADC countries such as Angola, 
South Africa and Botswana portrays disproportionate defence spending levels 
(Howe 2005:99). Figures from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) (2007) indicate that moderate defence spending does not serve as a 
strong indicator of militarisation in the SADC. The data from SIPRI, however, 
are qualified as figures are inaccurate due to estimates and other voids in official 
figures that undermine their credibility. Zimbabwe’s figures, for example, are 
distorted by economic collapse while figures of the DR Congo are estimates, 
although both portray prominent militarised-styled activities in the region. 
South Africa is spending large sums of money on new defence acquisitions, but it 
remains uncertain as to whether this stems from the defence budget. Ultimately, 
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defence spending by member states serves as a vague indicator of militarisation 
in the SADC region.
Whether all members of SADC are committed to a culture of peacefully resolving 
conflicts that extends beyond a mere declaration of intent, is not beyond doubt. 
Leadership solidarity and the weakness of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) to 
act against transgressors combined with an unwillingness to take a hard stance 
against aggressors offer a forgiving environment for those members considering 
a more militarist pathway. Member states are more concerned with their own 
interests, which strain collective decision making regarding high-politics and 
cause more divisions than congruence.7 Divisions about ‘who is in and who is 
out’ offer leeway for state behaviour and opportunities for militarism.8 In the 
section below, several examples of state behaviour in the SADC are presented 
that are reminiscent of a culture which readily turns to the military option to 
resolve conflict and which pursues national rather than regional security and 
interests.
Zimbabwe illustrates perhaps most visibly the encroachment of elements 
of militarism as the press recently identified militarisation as the most 
fundamental problem in Zimbabwean politics (Mangcu 2007). Zimbabwe 
gained independence through a liberation war, the legacy of which is kept alive 
in the Zimbabwean mind. After independence, the new political incumbents 
almost immediately turned to the military instrument to deal with perceived 
threats from it own population (Matabeles in particular) – a campaign lasting 
several years and discontinued by 1987.9 About a decade later (1998), Zimbabwe 
participated in the controversial episode to deploy armed forces to the DR Congo 
for alleged personal and business reasons that still remain shady and divisive. 
In the wake of the DR Congo debacle there followed the militant role of ‘War 
7 See concluding remarks by Ngubane and Solomon (2003), and also Nathan 2006: 617.
8 SADC members demonstrated a surprising propensity for military coercion during 1998. 
Ignoring the required authority of the Summit, these interventions demonstrate a hidden 
militarist preference amongst some members that is not often noticed. The militaristic 
notion is reinforced by the solidarity principle that often prevented proper sanctioning of 
such behaviour and thus offering further leeway for growth (Nathan 2006: 611-613).
9 See Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) & Legal Resources Foundation 
(LRF) 1999; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003:24-25.
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Veterans’ in Zimbabwe, the introduction of a militant national youth service 
and the actions of the military during the 2001 election (Moller 2003:28-29; 
McIntyre 2007:21). The 2002 stance of the Zimbabwean Army Chief on the non-
allegiance of the army to a leader not suiting their liberation criteria, further 
accentuated a lingering liberation culture and the ‘behind the scenes’ role of 
the Zimbabwean military (Nyaira & Nyamutata 2002).  By 2008 the role of the 
Zimbabwean security chiefs became so pervasive that the Zimbabwean president 
could barely survive without the active intervention of the security forces and 
ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front) militants to 
ensure his reign (Peta 2008:1).
By the middle of 2007, the Zimbabwean leader continued to praise the 
Zimbabwean defence establishment (AllAfrica 2007). His emphasis upon the 
interface between the defence force and the Zimbabwean society to uphold 
certain faltering institutions serves as a further indicator of the Zimbabwean 
military not being an apolitical and silent partner. This dangerous nexus features 
amidst allegations of the military chiefs benefiting from the chaos and therefore 
not inclined to restore order (Mangcu 2007). Rumours of a failed 2007 coup 
attempt further add to the political interference of the Zimbabwean military, 
although still officially denied (Africa Research Bulletin 2007a:17129). Reported by 
several agencies, the attempted coup nonetheless underlines the stark possibility 
of military interference in Zimbabwean affairs of state – an interference that 
became glaringly exposed during the 2008 presidential re-election.  In effect, the 
Zimbabwean defence force and police service penetrate domestic politics and 
society amidst a regional image of solidarity with the leadership, the regime and 
its militant undertones.
In South Africa, a number of factors temper the idea of a major shift in strategic 
culture. First, the lingering presence of former SADF members within the 
military decision-making structures ties in with the argument of Vale that 
dramatic shifts do not take place overnight (Vale 1994:38). The stark reality is 
that the different politico-military factions and parties brought their strategic 
cultures to the integration process. The merging of different armed forces 
represents a mixture of politicised soldiers and even former coup plotters from 
the former Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) forces that stood 
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close to their earlier political masters (Williams 2006:45, 47). Secondly, a major 
and very expensive, albeit controversial, upgrading and acquisition programme 
is underway for the South African military. Thirdly, South Africa is the leading 
nation in both the AU as well as SADC as far as providing military contingents 
is concerned (Lekota 2007). The 2007 Defence Update is particularly focused 
upon making the peacekeeping role more salient, or at least not a mere spillover 
of primary capabilities. This policy shift that narrows the primary-secondary 
divide creates conceptual space to keep the South African armed forces a salient 
policy instrument for the region.
The incumbent South African military and political leadership are quite closely 
connected. Most members of the governing party are also former members of 
the military wing of the African National Congress, Umkontho weSizwe (MK). 
These former MK members now dominate affairs of state both politically 
as well as strategically. As for the upcoming 2009 elections, MK veterans are 
actively mobilising in support of the Zuma faction – a matter viewed closely by 
intelligence circles. Mobilisation by a dissatisfied group with military skills and 
experience holds some danger for the infighting in the ranks of the governing 
party – a matter further accentuated by a perception that the position of the 
South African president is closely connected to the support of his security chiefs 
(Sole & Majova 2007:4; Carte Blanche 2007).10
The South African Defence Minister is also on record for stating that within the 
AU, the SADC will increasingly take on the main role of dealing with conflicts 
on the continent. Speaking at the arrival of the third submarine for the South 
African Navy, he alluded to the contribution of the new frigates and submarines 
to provide security for the SADC (Africa Research Bulletin 2007b:17094). In 
contrast to speaking out against the US AFRICOM (US Africa Command) idea, 
the minister alluded to Africa and the SADC in particular to shoulder more 
of the security burden. Simultaneously, a South African naval task force that 
comprised newly arrived vessels engaged in naval exercises with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and American naval contingents off the 
10 The 2008 ousting of President Mbeki in favour of an interim arrangement without any 
response by the security chiefs tends to ameliorate this view.
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South African coast. In this regard it is no secret that South Africa is perhaps the 
lead nation in bringing the SADC Brigade closer to operational readiness and 
in the process is also strengthening South African military readiness in general 
(Hartley 2007).
At times, South Africa also bordered on breaking the multilateral imperative 
and quest for pacifist solutions, as demonstrated through its 1998 involvement 
in Lesotho, and to a lesser extent in Burundi (Habib & Selinyane 2006:6). In 
addition, DENEL (a South African armaments corporation) shifted its focus 
to equipment for regional peacekeeping functions and to support the SADC 
Brigade (Africa Research Bulletin 2005a:16265). Both from the media, as well 
as through official acknowledgements, South African military commitments to 
the African continent are already overstretched. Nonetheless, the South African 
leadership displays a strange determination to support diplomatic initiatives 
with even more expensive military commitments (Africa Research Bulletin 
2005b:16337).
Recent military incursions into the DR Congo by Zambian forces, as well as 
Angolan military contingents draw the attention to this unsettled and volatile 
SADC member. The aforementioned incursions point to the difficulty for the DR 
Congo to secure its fragile sovereignty. Both incursions potentially threaten, or 
are directed at protecting rich deposits of diamonds and copper and thus create 
a rationale for Congolese armed forces to defend Congolese national integrity 
and values (Africa Research Bulletin 2007c:17069). Inherently, this state of affairs 
holds the threat of an intra-regional military clash. Simultaneously a rogue 
Congolese general is further upsetting the peacebuilding in the DR Congo, with 
the national leadership now intent upon a military solution to settle the matter 
of rogue elements once and for all. However, this latter event is merely a window 
upon the military profile of current events that dominate the strategic landscape 
of the DR Congo. Congolese forces are still arrayed against rebels and militias 
and even shady criminal elements within the national military establishment 
with the softer MONUC peacekeepers caught up between the fighting factions 
(Africa Research Bulletin 2007e:17160).
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Although the war in the DR Congo was officially declared over during 2003, 
military insecurities persisted with political opposition alternating between 
politics proper and armed politics (Africa Research Bulletin 2005c:16265). 
The EU special envoy Ajello, notes that Congolese officers are ‘… more active 
in the corridors of the presidential palace than on the battlefield …’ and thus 
ensure a strong military input into political decision making. The military 
presence is overbearing and officers exploit the bloated military and faltering 
demobilisation and reconstruction process that in turn calls for quicker and 
deeper army reforms (Africa Research Bulletin 2007f:17024-17025). It appears 
that the swell of military personnel in the DR Congo permeates many walks of 
life – including the political sphere.
The DR Congo contends with insecurity in a hard military way and thus 
brings this culture to the SADC. The military nature of threats within the DR 
Congo could also ‘compel’ responses with a strong military backing if it is to 
succeed (Africa Research Bulletin 2005d:16349). A further practice that adds to 
militarisation is that of Congolese politicians not always favouring the collapse 
or defeat of rebel groups, for they use them as personal militias when needed 
(Africa Research Bulletin 2007g:17123). Set alongside child soldier armies, both 
phenomena further contribute to militarisation of the Congolese society. One 
estimate sets the number of child soldiers in the DR Congo as high as 30 000. 
This contributes to a military mindset among the younger generation (McIntyre 
2007:21; Africa Research Bulletin 2007d:16978). The Congolese military policy 
instrument thus features prominently amidst the militarisation of politics by 
official and rogue-styled actors, with many of the guilty parties now serving in 
government positions.
In Angola, the closeness of the military to government is displayed by the fact 
that Angolan armed forces, both as liberation as well as a national defence 
establishment, served as prominent extensions of the governing party. In 
effect, since independence in 1975, the Angolan armed forces featured as the 
most salient Angolan policy instrument (Malaquias 2000). In the aftermath of 
independence in the mid-seventies and up to 2002, Angola maintained large 
armed forces to offset UNITA  and to satisfy the need for forces in the DR 
Congo (Moller 2003:33). Demilitarisation in Angola is particularly complex 
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as progress first required a military victory over UNITA (National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola), but it was a victory that unfortunately also 
pushed militarisation to new heights (Porto et al 2007:ix). The ISS Monograph, 
From Soldiers to Citizens, for example, offers a glimpse into the enormity of the 
demilitarisation process in Angola and the deeply embedded notion of war in 
the psyche of society.11
Recent claims by an Angolan diplomat regarding efficiency of the Angolan 
armed forces to deal with conflicts on the continent caused some concern as 
well. Angolan armed forces also continue to play a role in the north of the 
country where the DR Congo-Angolan border region remains volatile. Diamond 
fields, the matter of Cabinda and the simmering of ideas about independence 
or greater autonomy sustain the need for a military presence. Following in the 
wake of the 1998 Angolan intervention in the DR Congo, it appears that the 
employment of the Angolan armed forces remains prominent (Africa Research 
Bulletin 2007h:17035-17036). A further disturbing factor is that the US vision 
of AFRICOM views Angola as a pillar to influence events in Central-Southern 
Africa and towards the Bay of Guinea with its lucrative off-shore oil resources. 
This view includes a military domain where Angola is to be ‘empowered’ to 
play a leading role (Africa Research Bulletin 2007i:17097). In essence, both the 
political as well as societal sectors of Angola find themselves strongly influenced 
by or even dependent upon militarised practices and influences.
Even a small country like Lesotho is not devoid of elements of militarisation 
of its politics (Molise-Ramakoae 2003:171-172). The 1998 SADC military 
response to events in Lesotho resulted from the lingering threat of a possible 
coup against the Lesotho government. Lesotho still reflects the dangers of an 
unhealthy closeness between political and military leadership, with elements 
of the Lesotho military allegedly continuing to act against opponents of the 
political incumbents (Neethling 2007:497). Accusations surfaced recently of an 
attempted coup by army mutineers and the political opposition pointed out that 
the governing party is invoking military force to deal with political opponents. 
11 Demobilised UNITA soldiers, for example, showed a particular propensity to hold 
non-civilian identities (Porto et al 2007: 114-115).
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Elements of the Lesotho armed forces seem quite involved in politics while the 
politicians are not innocent in this politico-military collapse (Neethling 2007; 
Africa Research Bulletin 2007j:17163-17167). The militarisation of Lesotho’s 
politics is once again rearing its head.
Concluding remarks
For regional security arrangements to mature, they require strong elements of 
consensus and cooperation by member states. One important stimulant for 
the migration towards maturity is the lowering of the military threat amongst 
member states and for these states to embrace a pacifist approach to resolve 
differences and possible conflicts amongst themselves. In the quest towards a 
common and preferably pacifist approach to resolving conflicts, member states 
bring their own peculiar strategic cultures to the regional security agenda. If 
deeply influenced by a propensity to depend upon or turn to their military 
establishments, this is the culture that they bring to the regional agenda.
Within the SADC, the movement from enmity to amity is visible in the 
strong and persistent commitment of SADC leaders to cooperate and resolve 
differences in ways other than going to war. In a declaratory sense (verbal, as well 
as written), consensus, commitment and solidarity towards building an SADC 
security community and eschewing war, feature prominently and display a 
sense of regional and national maturity. If viewed as ideas, preferences, concepts 
and commitments, the profile of the declaratory domain reflects a pacifist and 
cooperative image within the SADC realm. However, second-generation theory 
on strategic culture holds that the declaratory domain often differs from what 
eventually transpires at the operational level.
Operationally, statements, preferences, ideas and actions that stem from 
strategic culture are difficult to shed. Firstly, a culture of preferring and using the 
military instrument fades slowly. Several remnants of military practices, both 
psychological as well as material, depict the SADC strategic landscape. Secondly, 
actions often differ from statements and declarations. In the SADC, the void 
between official policy and operational responses is apparent as preferences for 
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and reliance upon the military instrument still feature in some leading member 
states:
•	 In Zimbabwe, a close connection between government and the 
armed forces can be traced from independence to the 2008 crisis. 
Militarisation in Zimbabwe is perhaps best illustrated by the stance 
of the defence chiefs on maintaining a militarised liberation culture 
in the political culture of Zimbabwe, thus also showing the tenacity of 
previous culture.
•	 South Africa portrays a legacy of close cooperation and affinity between 
the political and military establishments and one not altogether 
shunned by the ruling elite. A growing military involvement in Africa 
amidst modernisation programmes serves to accentuate the military 
instrument, while shifting the primary and secondary roles into closer 
proximity serves as a further indicator of an emergent South African 
strategic culture.
•	 The leadership of the DR Congo is more dependent upon national and 
international military forces than upon its own political legitimacy. It 
remains questionable whether the Congolese political establishment 
is bound to govern its national territory without resort to military 
coercion in the near future. Both the government and the opposition 
bring nothing else but a militarised strategic culture to the regional 
security agenda.
•	 In Angola, a history of one of the longest wars on the African 
continent has left its imprint. Large sections of society are infused with 
demobilised soldiers, including child soldiers, amidst a government-
military closeness brought about by almost half a century of consecutive 
liberation and civil wars. According to strategic culture theory (third 
generation in particular), such legacies linger for long periods and 
Angola is bound to display a strategic culture that privileges the 
military option for some time to come.
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•	 The tiny kingdom of Lesotho shows a continuing culture of not 
being able to sever the unhealthy politico-military nexus. The armed 
forces of Lesotho remain a quasi-political actor rather than being a 
professional military for foreign policy purposes. As such not only is 
the militarisation of politics perpetuated, but a culture that privileges 
the military option is carried into the regional culture.
A preferred strategic culture for SADC is well expressed and reflects a consistency 
in the declaratory make-up of the regional leadership that is not often disrupted. 
However, the operational domains of the declaratory preferences, ideas and 
images of SADC paint a different picture that diverges from the desired pacifist 
strategic culture. Domestic events and measures as well as interstate dynamics 
contain military features that in part flow from earlier pre-independence 
experiences. Also visible is a post-independence inclination by certain member 
states to regularly turn to the military instrument to resolve differences or 
pursue interests. Although militarisation of strategic culture seems pervasive, it 
is also possible to portray emergent SADC strategic culture as consonant with 
the theory that two strategic cultures can coexist within one actor: Firstly, it 
is illustrative of second-generation theory in that declaratory and operational 
commitments tend to differ in the pursuit of national hegemony. Secondly, and 
perhaps more accurately, the SADC illustrates the often claimed long periods 
that underpin shifts in strategic culture. The strong verbal and declaratory 
commitments by SADC leaders are perhaps a first step to bring the militarised 
operational responses into line with the declared and desired strategic culture of 
amity and a pacifist approach to dealing with conflict.
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